Morganti, Matteo (2011) Is There a Compelling Argument for Ontic Structural Realism? Philosophy of Science, 78 (5). pp. 1165-1176.

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Abstract

Structural realism first emerged as an epistemological thesis aimed to avoid the so-called pessimistic meta-induction on the history of science. Some authors, however, suggested that the preservation of structure across theory-change is best explained by endorsing the metaphysical thesis that structure is all there is. While the possibility of this latter, „ontic‟ form of structural realism has been extensively debated, though, not much has been said concerning its justification. In this paper, I distinguish between two arguments in favour of ontic structural realism that can be reconstructed from the literature, and find both of them wanting.

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Item Type:	Published Article or Volume
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Morganti, Matteo mmorganti@uniroma3.it
Keywords:	Structural Realism; Ontic; Epistemic; Underdetermination; Relations
Subjects:	General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Depositing User:	Dr. Matteo Morganti
Date Deposited:	31 Jan 2012 13:49
Last Modified:	31 Jan 2012 13:49
Item ID:	9003
Journal or Publication Title:	Philosophy of Science
Subjects:	General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Date:	December 2011
Page Range:	pp. 1165-1176
Volume:	78
Number:	5
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/9003

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