Mizrahi, Moti (2012) Reconsidering the Argument from Underconsideration. In: UNSPECIFIED.

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Abstract

According to the argument from underconsideration, since theory evaluation is comparative, and since scientists do not have good reasons to believe that they are epistemically privileged, it is unlikely that our best theories are true. In this paper, I examine two formulations of this argument, one based on van Fraassen’s “bad lot” premise and another based on what Lipton called the “no-privilege” premise. I consider several moves that scientific realists might make in response to these arguments. I then offer a revised argument that is a middle ground between realism and anti-realism, or so I argue.

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Item Type:	Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Mizrahi, Moti motimizra@gmail.com
Keywords:	anti-realism, argument from underconsideration, bad lot, epistemic privilege, scientific realism
Subjects:	General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Depositing User:	Dr. Moti Mizrahi
Date Deposited:	20 Jun 2012 12:28
Last Modified:	01 Nov 2013 22:19
Item ID:	9170
Subjects:	General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Date:	16 June 2012
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/9170

Available Versions of this Item

• Reconsidering the Argument from Underconsideration. (deposited 20 Jun 2012 12:28) [Currently Displayed]
  • The Argument from Underconsideration and Relative Realism. (deposited 01 Nov 2013 22:19)

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