Franceschi, Paul (2002) A Third Route to the Doomsday Argument. [Preprint]

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Abstract

In this paper, I present a solution to the Doomsday argument based on a third type of solution, by contrast to on the one hand, the Carter-Leslie view and on the other hand, the Eckhardt-Sowers-Sober analysis. The present line of thought is based on the fact that both aforementioned analyses are based on an inaccurate analogy. After discussing the imperfections of both models, I present then a novel model that fits more adequately with the human situation corresponding to the Doomsday argument. This last model also encapsulates both Carter-Leslie's and Eckhardt et al.'s models, and reveals a link with the issue of mind-body dualism. Lastly I argue that this novel analogy, combined with an adequate solution to the reference class problem, leads to a novel formulation of the argument that could well be more consensual than the original one

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Franceschi, Paul
Keywords:	Doomsday argument, indeterminism
Subjects:	General Issues > Determinism/Indeterminism
Depositing User:	Paul Franceschi
Date Deposited:	05 Dec 2002
Last Modified:	07 Oct 2010 15:11
Item ID:	925
Subjects:	General Issues > Determinism/Indeterminism
Date:	December 2002
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/925

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• A Third Route to the Doomsday Argument. (deposited 12 Oct 2002)
  • A Third Route to the Doomsday Argument. (deposited 05 Dec 2002) [Currently Displayed]

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