Items where Author is "Climenhaga, Nevin"
Group by: Item Type | No Grouping Number of items: 7. Climenhaga, Nevin (2023) Epistemic Probabilities are Degrees of Support, not Degrees of (Rational) Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Climenhaga, Nevin (2020) Evidence and Inductive Inference. The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence, edited by Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn. Climenhaga, Nevin and DesAutels, Lane and Ramsey, Grant (2019) Causal Inference from Noise. [Preprint] Climenhaga, Nevin (2019) The Structure of Epistemic Probabilities. Philosophical Studies. pp. 1-30. ISSN 0031-8116 Climenhaga, Nevin (2017) Inference to the Best Explanation Made Incoherent. Journal of Philosophy. Climenhaga, Nevin (2016) How Explanation Guides Confirmation. Philosophy of Science. Climenhaga, Nevin (2013) A Problem For the Alternative Difference Measure of Confirmation. [Preprint] |
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