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Entities without intrinsic physical identity

Lam, Vincent (2014) Entities without intrinsic physical identity. [Preprint]

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Abstract

This paper critically discusses recent objections that have been raised against the contextual understanding of fundamental physical objects advocated by non-eliminative ontic structural realism. One of these recent objections claims that such a purely relational understanding of objects cannot account for there being a determinate number of them. A more general objection concerns a well-known circularity threat: relations presuppose the objects they relate and so cannot account for them. A similar circularity objection has also been raised within the framework of the weak discernibility claims made in the last few years about quantum particles. We argue that these objections rely either on mere metaphysical prejudice or on confusing the logico-mathematical formalism within which a physical theory is formulated with the physical theory itself. Furthermore, we defend the motivations for taking numerical diversity as a primitive fact in this context.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Lam, Vincentvincent.lam@unil.ch
Keywords: Non-eliminative ontic structural realism, self-identity, individuality, cardinality, circularity, weak discernibility, physical identity, primitive numerical diversity.
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Mathematics
Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics
Depositing User: Vincent Lam
Date Deposited: 11 Jan 2014 16:08
Last Modified: 11 Jan 2014 16:08
Item ID: 10219
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Mathematics
Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics
Date: 11 January 2014
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10219

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