PhilSci Archive

How Believing Can Fail to Be Knowing

Ramachandran, Murali (2006) How Believing Can Fail to Be Knowing. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 21 (2). pp. 185-194. ISSN 2171-679X

[img]
Preview
PDF
537-558-1-PB-1.pdf - Published Version
Available under License Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives.

Download (203kB)

Abstract

This paper defends a simple, externalist account of knowledge, incorporating familiar conditions mentioned in the literature, and responds to Timothy Williamson’s charge that any such analysis is futile because knowledge is semantically un-analyzable. The response, in short, is that even though such an account may not offer a reductive analysis of knowledge—by way of more basic, non-circular concepts—it still has an explanatory advantage over Williamson’s own position: it explains how belief can fail to be knowledge.


Export/Citation: EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
Social Networking:
Share |

Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Ramachandran, Muralimuralir@sussex.ac.uk
Additional Information: ISSN: 0495-4548 (print)
Keywords: knowledge, externalism, closure principle, Williamson
Depositing User: Users 15304 not found.
Date Deposited: 11 Mar 2014 15:10
Last Modified: 11 Mar 2014 15:10
Item ID: 10456
Journal or Publication Title: THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
Publisher: Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
Official URL: http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/vi...
DOI or Unique Handle: 10.1387/theoria.537
Date: May 2006
Page Range: pp. 185-194
Volume: 21
Number: 2
ISSN: 2171-679X
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10456

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Altmetric.com

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item