Ramachandran, Murali (2006) How Believing Can Fail to Be Knowing. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 21 (2). pp. 185-194. ISSN 2171-679X

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Abstract

This paper defends a simple, externalist account of knowledge, incorporating familiar conditions mentioned in the literature, and responds to Timothy Williamson’s charge that any such analysis is futile because knowledge is semantically un-analyzable. The response, in short, is that even though such an account may not offer a reductive analysis of knowledge—by way of more basic, non-circular concepts—it still has an explanatory advantage over Williamson’s own position: it explains how belief can fail to be knowledge.

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Item Type:	Published Article or Volume
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Ramachandran, Murali muralir@sussex.ac.uk
Additional Information:	ISSN: 0495-4548 (print)
Keywords:	knowledge, externalism, closure principle, Williamson
Depositing User:	Users 15304 not found.
Date Deposited:	11 Mar 2014 15:10
Last Modified:	11 Mar 2014 15:10
Item ID:	10456
Journal or Publication Title:	THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
Publisher:	Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
Official URL:	http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/vi...
DOI or Unique Handle:	10.1387/theoria.537
Date:	May 2006
Page Range:	pp. 185-194
Volume:	21
Number:	2
ISSN:	2171-679X
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10456

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