PhilSci Archive

A Functional Account of Causation

Woodward, James (2014) A Functional Account of Causation. [Preprint]

[img] Microsoft Word
_Woodward_Revised_PSA_Presx_10._2__.docx

Download (123kB)
[img]
Preview
PDF
_Woodward_Revised_PSA_Presx_10._2__.pdf

Download (702kB)

Abstract

This essay advocates a “functional” approach to causation and causal reasoning: these are to be understood in terms of the goals and purposes of causal thinking. This approach is distinguished from accounts based on metaphysical considerations or on reconstruction of “intuitions”.


Export/Citation: EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
Social Networking:
Share |

Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Woodward, Jamesjfw@pitt.edu
Keywords: causation, explanation, metaphysics, intuition
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
General Issues > Explanation
Depositing User: Jim Woodward
Date Deposited: 24 Aug 2014 16:26
Last Modified: 24 Aug 2014 16:26
Item ID: 10978
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
General Issues > Explanation
Date: 24 August 2014
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10978

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item