Woodward, James (2014) A Functional Account of Causation. [Preprint]
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Abstract
This essay advocates a “functional” approach to causation and causal reasoning: these are to be understood in terms of the goals and purposes of causal thinking. This approach is distinguished from accounts based on metaphysical considerations or on reconstruction of “intuitions”.
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Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
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Keywords: | causation, explanation, metaphysics, intuition | ||||||
Subjects: | General Issues > Causation General Issues > Explanation |
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Depositing User: | Jim Woodward | ||||||
Date Deposited: | 24 Aug 2014 16:26 | ||||||
Last Modified: | 24 Aug 2014 16:26 | ||||||
Item ID: | 10978 | ||||||
Subjects: | General Issues > Causation General Issues > Explanation |
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Date: | 24 August 2014 | ||||||
URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10978 |
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