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Emotion Versus Cognition in Moral Decision-Making: A Dubious Dichotomy

Woodward, James (2014) Emotion Versus Cognition in Moral Decision-Making: A Dubious Dichotomy. [Preprint]

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Abstract

This paper explores, in the light of recent empirical results from neurobiology, some issues having to do with the contrast between “emotion” and “cognition” and the ways in which these figure in moral judgment and decision-making. The role of reward learning in emotional processing and the implications of this for "rationalist" moral theories is emphasized.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Woodward, Jamesjfw@pitt.edu
Keywords: emotion, reward processing, moral decision-making
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Biology > Neuroscience
Specific Sciences > Psychology/Psychiatry
Depositing User: Jim Woodward
Date Deposited: 26 Aug 2014 21:55
Last Modified: 26 Aug 2014 21:55
Item ID: 10979
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Biology > Neuroscience
Specific Sciences > Psychology/Psychiatry
Date: 24 August 2014
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10979

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