Woodward, James (2014) Emotion Versus Cognition in Moral Decision-Making: A Dubious Dichotomy. [Preprint]
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Abstract
This paper explores, in the light of recent empirical results from neurobiology, some issues having to do with the contrast between “emotion” and “cognition” and the ways in which these figure in moral judgment and decision-making. The role of reward learning in emotional processing and the implications of this for "rationalist" moral theories is emphasized.
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Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
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Keywords: | emotion, reward processing, moral decision-making | ||||||
Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Neuroscience Specific Sciences > Psychology |
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Depositing User: | Jim Woodward | ||||||
Date Deposited: | 26 Aug 2014 21:55 | ||||||
Last Modified: | 26 Aug 2014 21:55 | ||||||
Item ID: | 10979 | ||||||
Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Neuroscience Specific Sciences > Psychology |
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Date: | 24 August 2014 | ||||||
URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10979 |
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