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Going against the Grain: Functionalism and Generalization in Cognitive Science

Akagi, Mikio (2014) Going against the Grain: Functionalism and Generalization in Cognitive Science. In: UNSPECIFIED.

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Abstract

Functionalism is widely regarded as the central doctrine in the philosophy of cognitive science, and is invoked by philosophers of cognitive science to settle disputes over methodology and other puzzles. I describe a recent dispute over extended cognition in which many commentators appeal to functionalism. I then raise an objection to functionalism as it figures in this dispute, targeting the assumption that generality and abstraction are tightly correlated. Finally, I argue that the new mechanist framework offers more realistic resources for understanding cognitive science, and hence is a better source of appeal for resolving disagreement in philosophy of science.


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Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Akagi, Mikiomikio.akagi@gmail.com
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
Depositing User: Mikio Akagi
Date Deposited: 31 Oct 2014 02:09
Last Modified: 31 Oct 2014 02:09
Item ID: 11100
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
Date: 6 November 2014
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/11100

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