PhilSci Archive

Rational credences are private

McCutcheon, Randall G. (2014) Rational credences are private. [Preprint]

[img]
Preview
PDF
Beauty4.pdf

Download (59kB)

Abstract

Anti-expertise, or self-defeating belief, leads to incoherent personal credences. Some philosophers think that anti-expertise is irrational but avoidable (probabilism), others think that some cases of anti-expertise are rational (anti-probabilism), and still others think that anti-expertise is irrational and unavoidable (nihilism about rationality). Taking as premises some standard assumptions about the Sleeping Beauty Problem, I prove that if Beauty maintains public credences then she is prone to anti-expertise unless she embraces optimism, i.e. denies that she will experience multiple awakenings if tails.


Export/Citation: EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
Social Networking:
Share |

Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
McCutcheon, Randall G. rmcctchn@memphis.edu
Keywords: Anti-expertise, incoherent credences, probabilism, Sleeping Beauty, optimism, Newcomb paradox
Subjects: General Issues > Decision Theory
Depositing User: Dr. Randall G. McCutcheon
Date Deposited: 08 Dec 2014 02:01
Last Modified: 08 Dec 2014 02:01
Item ID: 11184
Subjects: General Issues > Decision Theory
Date: 3 December 2014
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/11184

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item