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Normative Theory and Descriptive Psychology in Understanding Causal Reasoning: The Role of Interventions and Invariance

Woodward, James (2015) Normative Theory and Descriptive Psychology in Understanding Causal Reasoning: The Role of Interventions and Invariance. [Preprint]

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Abstract

This paper, like its companion (“Causal Cognition: Physical Connections, Proportionality, and the Role of Normative Theory”) explores some ways in which, on the one hand, normative (philosophical or theoretical) theorizing about causation and causal reasoning and, on the other, empirical psychological investigations into causal cognition can be mutually illuminating. The topics considered include the connection between causal claims and claims about the outcomes of interventions and the various ways that invariance claims figure in causal judgment.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Woodward, Jamesjfw@pitt.edu
Keywords: causation, interventions, invariance, empirical psychology of causal judgment
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
Specific Sciences > Psychology/Psychiatry
Depositing User: Jim Woodward
Date Deposited: 23 Aug 2015 14:02
Last Modified: 23 Aug 2015 14:02
Item ID: 11629
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
Specific Sciences > Psychology/Psychiatry
Date: 21 August 2015
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/11629

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