Woodward, James (2015) Normative Theory and Descriptive Psychology in Understanding Causal Reasoning: The Role of Interventions and Invariance. [Preprint]
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Abstract
This paper, like its companion (“Causal Cognition: Physical Connections, Proportionality, and the Role of Normative Theory”) explores some ways in which, on the one hand, normative (philosophical or theoretical) theorizing about causation and causal reasoning and, on the other, empirical psychological investigations into causal cognition can be mutually illuminating. The topics considered include the connection between causal claims and claims about the outcomes of interventions and the various ways that invariance claims figure in causal judgment.
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| Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
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| Keywords: | causation, interventions, invariance, empirical psychology of causal judgment | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Causation Specific Sciences > Psychology |
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| Depositing User: | Jim Woodward | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 23 Aug 2015 14:02 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 23 Aug 2015 14:02 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 11629 | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Causation Specific Sciences > Psychology |
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| Date: | 21 August 2015 | ||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/11629 |
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