Hochstein, Eric (2016) Categorizing the Mental. Philosophical Quarterly.

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Abstract

A common view in the philosophy of mind and philosophy of psychology is that there is an ideally correct way of categorizing the structures and operations of the mind, and that the goal of neuroscience and psychology is to find this correct categorizational scheme. Categories which cannot find a place within this correct framework ought to be eliminated from scientific practice. In this paper, I argue that this general idea runs counter to productive scientific practices. Such a view ignores the plurality of aims and goals that neuroscientists and psychologists have in studying mental phenomena, and the necessity of employing distinct classificatory frameworks to achieve them.

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Item Type:	Published Article or Volume
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Hochstein, Eric eghochst@gmail.com
Keywords:	Mental categorization; natural kinds; eliminativism; concepts; emotions
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science General Issues > Explanation General Issues > Models and Idealization Specific Sciences > Neuroscience General Issues > Philosophers of Science Specific Sciences > Psychology
Depositing User:	Dr. Eric Hochstein
Date Deposited:	27 Jan 2016 14:34
Last Modified:	27 Jan 2016 14:34
Item ID:	11825
Journal or Publication Title:	Philosophical Quarterly
DOI or Unique Handle:	10.1093/pq/pqw001
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science General Issues > Explanation General Issues > Models and Idealization Specific Sciences > Neuroscience General Issues > Philosophers of Science Specific Sciences > Psychology
Date:	2016
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/11825

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