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Does the Counterfactual Theory of Explanation Apply to Non-Causal Explanations in Metaphysics?

Reutlinger, Alexander (2016) Does the Counterfactual Theory of Explanation Apply to Non-Causal Explanations in Metaphysics? [Preprint]

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Abstract

In the recent philosophy of explanation, a growing attention to and discussion of non-causal explanations has emerged, as there seem to be compelling examples of non-causal explanations in the sciences, in pure mathematics, and in metaphysics. I defend the claim that the counterfactual theory of explanation (CTE) captures the explanatory character of both non-causal scientific and metaphysical explanations. According to the CTE, scientific and metaphysical explanations are explanatory by virtue of revealing counterfactual dependencies between the explanandum and the explanans. I support this claim by illustrating that CTE is applicable to Euler’s explanation (an example of a non-causal scientific explanation) and Loewer’s explanation (an example of a non-causal metaphysical explanation).


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Reutlinger, AlexanderAlexander.Reutlinger@lrz.uni-muenchen.de
Additional Information: forthcoming in European Journal for Philosophy of Science
Keywords: scientific explanation, non-causal explanation, metaphysical explanation, mathematical explanation, grounding
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
General Issues > Causation
General Issues > Explanation
General Issues > Laws of Nature
General Issues > Models and Idealization
Depositing User: Alexander Reutlinger
Date Deposited: 18 Jul 2016 13:31
Last Modified: 18 Jul 2016 13:31
Item ID: 12291
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
General Issues > Causation
General Issues > Explanation
General Issues > Laws of Nature
General Issues > Models and Idealization
Date: July 2016
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/12291

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