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Deductive Pluralism

Hosack, John M. (2016) Deductive Pluralism. [Preprint]

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Abstract

This paper proposes an approach to the philosophy of
mathematics, deductive pluralism, that is designed to
satisfy the criteria of inclusiveness of and consistency
with mathematical practice.
Deductive pluralism views mathematical statements as
assertions that a result follows from logical and
mathematical foundations and that there are a variety of
incompatible foundations such as standard foundations,
constructive foundations, or univalent foundations.
The advantages of this philosophy include the elimination
of ontological problems, epistemological clarity, and
objectivity.
Possible objections and relations with some other
philosophies of mathematics are also considered.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Hosack, John M.hosack@alumni.caltech.edu
Keywords: philosophy of mathematics, deductivism, if-thenism, pluralism
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Mathematics
Depositing User: Dr. John Hosack
Date Deposited: 25 Jul 2016 17:05
Last Modified: 25 Jul 2016 17:05
Item ID: 12303
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Mathematics
Date: 24 July 2016
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/12303

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