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Must Evidence Underdetermine Theory?

Norton, John D. (2003) Must Evidence Underdetermine Theory? [Preprint]

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      Abstract

      According to the underdetermination thesis, all evidence necessarily underdetermines any scientific theory. Thus it is often argued that our agreement on the content of mature scientific theories must be due to social and other factors. Drawing on a long standing tradition of criticism, I shall argue that the underdetermination thesis is little more than speculation based on an impoverished account of induction. A more careful look at accounts of induction does not support an assured underdetermination or the holism usually associated with it. I also urge that the display of observationally equivalent theories is a self-defeating strategy for supporting the underdetermination thesis. The very fact that observational equivalence can be demonstrated by arguments brief enough to be included in a journal article means that we cannot preclude the possibility that the theories are merely variant formulations of the same theory.


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      Item Type: Preprint
      Additional Information: Prepared for the First Notre Dame-Bielefeld Interdisciplinary Conference on Science and Values Zentrum für Interdisziplinäre Forschung, Universität Bielefeld, July 9-12, 2003.
      Keywords: Underdetermination evidence induction confirmation observation equivalence Duhem Quine
      Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
      General Issues > Theory/Observation
      General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
      General Issues > Conventionalism
      Depositing User: John Norton
      Date Deposited: 08 Aug 2003
      Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:11
      Item ID: 1257
      URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/1257

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