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The Incentive to Share in the Intermediate Results Game

Heesen, Remco (2016) The Incentive to Share in the Intermediate Results Game. [Preprint]

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Abstract

I discuss a game-theoretic model in which scientists compete to finish the intermediate stages of some research project. Banerjee et al. have previously shown that if the credit awarded for intermediate results is proportional to their difficulty, then the strategy profile in which scientists share each intermediate stage as soon as they complete it is a Nash equilibrium. I show that the equilibrium is both unique and strict. Thus rational credit-maximizing scientists have an incentive to share their intermediate results, as long as this is sufficiently rewarded.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Heesen, Remcordh51@cam.ac.uk0000-0003-3823-944X
Keywords: social structure of science; data sharing; credit; priority rule; network science
Subjects: General Issues > Decision Theory
General Issues > Science Policy
Depositing User: Remco Heesen
Date Deposited: 09 Dec 2016 19:35
Last Modified: 09 Dec 2016 19:35
Item ID: 12682
Subjects: General Issues > Decision Theory
General Issues > Science Policy
Date: 8 December 2016
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/12682

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