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Logical Disagreement and Aggregation

Tajer, Diego (2017) Logical Disagreement and Aggregation. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 32 (1). pp. 63-87. ISSN 2171-679X

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Abstract

In this paper, I explore the possibility of applying the methods and results of Judgement Aggregation to the problem of logical disagreement. I develop and evaluate different ways in which individuals who logically disagree can generate a collective logic. I prove a version of the discursive paradox, where the majority voting of a group of structural logicians can give rise to a substructural logic; then I develop a more general impossibility result. After this, I analyze different ways to avoid the paradox, in particular some methods which appeal to domain restrictions. Finally, I consider the application of these results to the discussion on semantic paradoxes.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Tajer, Diegodiegotajer@gmail.com
Additional Information: ISSN: 0495-4548 (print)
Keywords: Logical disagreement; Judgement Aggregation; Non-classical logics; Semantic paradoxes.
Subjects: General Issues > Decision Theory
General Issues > Structure of Theories
Depositing User: Unnamed user with email theoria@ehu.es
Date Deposited: 06 Mar 2017 15:33
Last Modified: 06 Mar 2017 15:33
Item ID: 12878
Journal or Publication Title: THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
Publisher: Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
Official URL: http://www.ehu.eus/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/v...
DOI or Unique Handle: 10.1387/theoria.15716
Subjects: General Issues > Decision Theory
General Issues > Structure of Theories
Date: January 2017
Page Range: pp. 63-87
Volume: 32
Number: 1
ISSN: 2171-679X
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/12878

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