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Why There Isn't Intel-Level Causation in Mechanisms

Romero, Felipe (2015) Why There Isn't Intel-Level Causation in Mechanisms. Synthese, 192 (11). pp. 3731-3755.

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Abstract

The experimental interventions that provide evidence of causal relations are notably similar to those that provide evidence of constitutive relevance relations. In the first two sections, I show that this similarity creates a tension: there is an inconsistent triad between (1) Woodward's popular interventionist theory of causation, (2) Craver's mutual manipulability account of constitutive relevance in mechanisms, and a variety of arguments for (3) the incoherence of inter-level causation. I argue for an interpretation of the views in which the tension is merely apparent. I propose to explain inter-level relations without inter-level causation by appealing to the notion of fat-handed interventions, and an argument against inter-level causation which dissolves the problem.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Romero, Felipef.romero@uvt.nl
Keywords: Mechanisms, Mutual manipulability, Interventionism, Inter-level causation
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
General Issues > Explanation
Specific Sciences > Neuroscience
Specific Sciences > Psychology
Depositing User: Dr. Felipe Romero
Date Deposited: 04 Apr 2017 14:06
Last Modified: 04 Apr 2017 14:06
Item ID: 12956
Journal or Publication Title: Synthese
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0718-0
DOI or Unique Handle: 10.1007/s11229-015-0718-0
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
General Issues > Explanation
Specific Sciences > Neuroscience
Specific Sciences > Psychology
Date: 2015
Page Range: pp. 3731-3755
Volume: 192
Number: 11
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/12956

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