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Dynamic Humeanism

Hicks, Michael Townsen (2017) Dynamic Humeanism. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Humean accounts of laws of nature fail to distinguish between dynamic laws and static initial conditions. But this distinction plays a central role in scientific theorizing and explanation. I motivate the claim that this distinction should matter for the Humean, and show that current views lack the resources to explain it. I then develop a regularity theory which captures this distinction. My view takes empirical accessibility to be one of the primary features of laws, and I identify features laws must have to be empirically accessible. I then argue that laws with these features tend to be dynamic.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Hicks, Michael Townsenhicksmt@gmail.com
Keywords: Humean, physics, metaphysics, metaphysics of laws, Humeanism
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
General Issues > Laws of Nature
Specific Sciences > Physics
Depositing User: Dr. Michael Townsen Hicks
Date Deposited: 15 Mar 2018 15:41
Last Modified: 15 Mar 2018 15:41
Item ID: 13097
Official URL: https://academic.oup.com/bjps/advance-article/doi/...
DOI or Unique Handle: https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axx006
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
General Issues > Laws of Nature
Specific Sciences > Physics
Date: 2017
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/13097

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