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Levels: descriptive, explanatory, and ontological

List, Christian (2017) Levels: descriptive, explanatory, and ontological. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Scientists and philosophers frequently speak about levels of description, levels of explanation, and ontological levels. This paper proposes a unified framework for modelling levels. I give a general definition of a system of levels and show that it can accommodate descriptive, explanatory, and ontological notions of levels. I further illustrate the usefulness of this framework by applying it to some salient philosophical questions: (1) Is there a linear hierarchy of levels, with a fundamental level at the bottom? And what does the answer to this question imply for physicalism, the thesis that everything supervenes on the physical? (2) Are there emergent properties? (3) Are higher-level descriptions reducible to lower-level ones? (4) Can the relationship between normative and non-normative domains be viewed as one involving levels? Although I use the terminology of “levels”, the proposed framework can also represent “scales”, “domains”, or “subject matters”, where these are not linearly but only partially ordered by relations of supervenience or inclusion.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
List, Christian
Keywords: Levels of description, levels of explanation, ontological levels, supervenience, emergence, reduction, coarse-graining, category theory
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
Specific Sciences > Complex Systems
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
General Issues > Explanation
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
General Issues > Reductionism/Holism
General Issues > Structure of Theories
Depositing User: Christian List
Date Deposited: 08 Aug 2017 14:54
Last Modified: 08 Aug 2017 14:54
Item ID: 13311
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
Specific Sciences > Complex Systems
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
General Issues > Explanation
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
General Issues > Reductionism/Holism
General Issues > Structure of Theories
Date: 3 August 2017
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/13311

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