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Generalism and the Metaphysics of Ontic Structural Realism

Glick, David (2017) Generalism and the Metaphysics of Ontic Structural Realism. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Ontic structural realism (OSR) claims that all there is to the world is structure. But how can this slogan be turned into a worked-out metaphysics? Here I consider one potential answer: a metaphysical framework known as generalism (Dasgupta, 2009, 2016). According to the generalist, the most fundamental description of the world is not given in terms of individuals bearing properties, but rather, general facts about which states of affairs obtain. However, I contend that despite several apparent similarities between the positions, generalism is unable to capture the two main motivations for OSR. I suggest instead that OSR should be construed as a meta-metaphysical position.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Glick, Daviddglick@ithaca.edu0000-0001-7811-5658
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Physics
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Specific Sciences > Physics > Symmetries/Invariances
Depositing User: David Glick
Date Deposited: 29 Aug 2017 14:28
Last Modified: 29 Aug 2017 14:28
Item ID: 13367
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Physics
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Specific Sciences > Physics > Symmetries/Invariances
Date: 27 July 2017
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/13367

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