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Communism and the Incentive to Share in Science

Heesen, Remco (2017) Communism and the Incentive to Share in Science. Philosophy of Science, 84 (4). pp. 698-716.

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Abstract

The communist norm requires that scientists widely share the results of their work. Where did this norm come from, and how does it persist? I argue on the basis of a game-theoretic model that rational credit-maximizing scientists will in many cases conform to the norm. This means that the origins and persistence of the communist norm can be explained even in the absence of a social contract or enforcement, contrary to recent work by Michael Strevens but adding to previous work emphasizing the benefits of the incentive structure created by the priority rule.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Heesen, Remcordh51@cam.ac.uk0000-0003-3823-944X
Keywords: philosophy of science, social structure of science, communist norm, priority rule, formal epistemology, sharing in science
Subjects: General Issues > Decision Theory
General Issues > Science Policy
Depositing User: Remco Heesen
Date Deposited: 19 Sep 2017 17:53
Last Modified: 19 Sep 2017 17:53
Item ID: 13452
Journal or Publication Title: Philosophy of Science
Publisher: The University of Chicago Press
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/693875
DOI or Unique Handle: 10.1086/693875
Subjects: General Issues > Decision Theory
General Issues > Science Policy
Date: October 2017
Page Range: pp. 698-716
Volume: 84
Number: 4
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/13452

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