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Foundations of a Probabilistic Theory of Causal Strength

Sprenger, Jan (2017) Foundations of a Probabilistic Theory of Causal Strength. [Preprint]

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Abstract

This paper develops axiomatic foundations for a probabilistic theory of causal strength as difference-making. I proceed in three steps: First, I motivate the choice of causal Bayes nets as an adequate framework for defining and comparing measures of causal strength. Second, I prove several representation theorems for probabilistic measures of causal strength---that is, I demonstrate how these measures can be derived from a set of plausible adequacy conditions. Third, I use these results to argue for a specific measure of causal strength: the difference that interventions on the cause make for the probability of the effect. I conclude by discussing my results and outlining future research avenues.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Sprenger, Janjan.sprenger@unito.it0000-0003-0083-9685
Additional Information: Penultimate draft. The paper will appear soon in /The Philosophical Review/.
Keywords: probabilistic causation; interventionism; Bayesian networks; causal strength; formal epistemology
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
Specific Sciences > Computer Science
General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
General Issues > Explanation
Specific Sciences > Medicine
Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Depositing User: Jan Sprenger
Date Deposited: 10 Nov 2017 16:38
Last Modified: 10 Nov 2017 16:38
Item ID: 14108
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
Specific Sciences > Computer Science
General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
General Issues > Explanation
Specific Sciences > Medicine
Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Date: 1 November 2017
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/14108

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