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When No Reason For Is A Reason Against

Eva, Benjamin and Hartmann, Stephan (2017) When No Reason For Is A Reason Against. [Preprint]

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Abstract

We provide a Bayesian justification of the idea that, under certain conditions, the absence of an argument in favour of the truth of a hypothesis H constitutes a good argument against the truth of H.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Eva, Benjaminbenedgareva@icloud.com
Hartmann, StephanS.Hartmann@lmu.de
Keywords: Bayesian Epistemology, Argumentation
Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
Depositing User: Dr Benjamin Eva
Date Deposited: 21 Nov 2017 21:51
Last Modified: 21 Nov 2017 21:51
Item ID: 14132
Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
Date: 29 June 2017
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/14132

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