Eva, Benjamin and Hartmann, Stephan (2017) When No Reason For Is A Reason Against. [Preprint]
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Abstract
We provide a Bayesian justification of the idea that, under certain conditions, the absence of an argument in favour of the truth of a hypothesis H constitutes a good argument against the truth of H.
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Item Type: | Preprint | |||||||||
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Keywords: | Bayesian Epistemology, Argumentation | |||||||||
Subjects: | General Issues > Confirmation/Induction | |||||||||
Depositing User: | Dr Benjamin Eva | |||||||||
Date Deposited: | 21 Nov 2017 21:51 | |||||||||
Last Modified: | 12 Jul 2024 17:24 | |||||||||
Item ID: | 14132 | |||||||||
Subjects: | General Issues > Confirmation/Induction | |||||||||
Date: | 29 June 2017 | |||||||||
URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/14132 |
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When No Reason For Is A Reason Against. (deposited 29 Jun 2017 14:27)
- When No Reason For Is A Reason Against. (deposited 21 Nov 2017 21:51) [Currently Displayed]
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