PhilSci Archive

Ontic Structural Realism and Natural Necessity

Kallfelz, William (2015) Ontic Structural Realism and Natural Necessity. [Preprint]

This is the latest version of this item.

[img]
Preview
Text
Kallfelz_Ladyman_Lange_Aug7_2015.pdf

Download (221kB) | Preview

Abstract

J. Ladyman (1998-2009), Ladyman and Ross (2007) refine J. Worral's (1998) structural realism (SR), by developing an ontic structural realism (OSR) which they argue is a consistently naturalistic means of characterizing the ontology of fundamental physics. I argue that particular elements of M. Lange (2009) and M. Eklund (2006) strengthen and refine their project of characterizing fundamental physics via OSR and by extension, their presentation of information-theoretic structural realism (ITSR). I demonstrate this point by situating M. Lange’s (2009) discussion of nomological modality and natural necessity within Ladyman and Ross’s discussion of ITSR. The logical hierarchy evinced in Lange’s (2009) notion of ‘nomic stability’ further refines Ladyman and Ross’s claims through the addition of nuanced modal distinctions in a systematic framework. Moreover, I argue that what Lange considers are the ‘lawmakers’ (viz. subjunctive facts) serve as a de dicto rendition of some of Ladyman & Ross’s fundamental de re extensions and refinements of ‘real patterns’ (Dennett, 2001).


Export/Citation: EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
Social Networking:
Share |

Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Kallfelz, Williamwkallfelz@gmail.com
Additional Information: This is a more developed version of the 2013 preprint, in which I demonstrate by use of Lange's (2009) subjunctive facts the de dicto overlay of Ladyman & Lange's use of de re modality. Thus, I expand my concluding points by way of constructive example, that I only suggested in my 2013 manuscript.
Keywords: ontic structural realism, information theory, fundamental physics, nomological modality, nomic stability
Subjects: General Issues > Laws of Nature
General Issues > Models and Idealization
Specific Sciences > Physics
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Depositing User: Dr. William Kallfelz
Date Deposited: 27 Nov 2017 15:26
Last Modified: 27 Nov 2017 15:26
Item ID: 14148
Subjects: General Issues > Laws of Nature
General Issues > Models and Idealization
Specific Sciences > Physics
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Date: 7 August 2015
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/14148

Available Versions of this Item

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item