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Why minds are not emergent in Everett's theory

Gao, Shan (2018) Why minds are not emergent in Everett's theory. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Psychophysical supervenience requires that the mental properties of a system cannot change without the change of its physical properties. In this paper, I argue that the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics or Everett's theory seems to violate the principle of psychophysical supervenience. In order to be consistent with our experience, the theory assumes psychophysical supervenience in each world, including our world. However, this permits the possibility that under certain unitary time evolution which does not lead to world branching, the wave function of each world changes and correspondingly the mental states of the observers in the world also change, while the wave function of the total worlds does not change, which violates the principle of psychophysical supervenience for all worlds. It seems that one must go beyond Everett's theory such as denying multiplicity in order to avoid the failure of psychophysical supervenience.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Gao, Shansgao7319@uni.sydney.edu.au
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics
Depositing User: Prof. Shan Gao
Date Deposited: 30 Apr 2018 00:41
Last Modified: 30 Apr 2018 00:41
Item ID: 14604
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics
Date: 29 April 2018
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/14604

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