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Supervenient freedom and the free will deadlock

Elzein, Nadine and Pernu, Tuomas K. (2017) Supervenient freedom and the free will deadlock. Disputatio, 45. pp. 219-243.

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Abstract

Supervenient libertarianism maintains that indeterminism may exist at a supervening agency level, consistent with determinism at a subvening physical level. It seems as if this approach has the potential to break the longstanding deadlock in the free will debate, since it concedes to the traditional incompatibilist that agents can only do otherwise if they can do so in their actual circumstances, holding the past and the laws constant, while nonetheless arguing that this ability is compatible with physical determinism. However, we argue that supervenient libertarianism faces some serious problems, and that it fails to break us free from this deadlock within the free will debate.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Elzein, Nadine
Pernu, Tuomas K.
Keywords: compatibilism; determinism; incompatibilism; non-reductive physicalism; supervenient libertarianism
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
General Issues > Determinism/Indeterminism
General Issues > Explanation
General Issues > Laws of Nature
Specific Sciences > Physics
Specific Sciences > Psychology/Psychiatry
General Issues > Reductionism/Holism
Depositing User: Dr Tuomas K. Pernu
Date Deposited: 15 Aug 2018 20:21
Last Modified: 15 Aug 2018 20:21
Item ID: 14941
Journal or Publication Title: Disputatio
Official URL: https://content.sciendo.com/view/journals/disp/9/4...
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
General Issues > Determinism/Indeterminism
General Issues > Explanation
General Issues > Laws of Nature
Specific Sciences > Physics
Specific Sciences > Psychology/Psychiatry
General Issues > Reductionism/Holism
Date: 2017
Page Range: pp. 219-243
Volume: 45
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/14941

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