PhilSci Archive

Who Should Do Replication Labor?

Romero, Felipe (2018) Who Should Do Replication Labor? [Preprint]

[img]
Preview
Text
FR_WhoShouldDoReplicationLabor_Preprint.pdf

Download (354kB) | Preview

Abstract

. Scientists, for the most part, want to get it right. However, the social structures that govern their work undermine that aim, and this leads to nonreplicable findings in many fields. Because the social structure of science is a decentralized system, it is difficult to intervene. In this article, I discuss how we might do so, focusing on self-corrective-labor schemes (i.e., ways of distributing replication efforts within the scientific community). First, I argue that we need to implement a scheme that makes replication work outcome independent, systematic, and sustainable. Second, I use these three criteria to evaluate extant proposals, which place the responsibility for replication on original researchers, consumers of their research, students, or many labs. Third, on the basis of a philosophical analysis of the reward system of science and the benefits of the division of cognitive labor, I propose a scheme that satisfies the criteria better: the professional scheme. This scheme has two main components. First, the scientific community is organized into two groups: discovery researchers, who produce new findings, and confirmation researchers, whose primary function is to do confirmation work (i.e., replication, reproduction, meta-analysis). Second, a distinct reward system is established for confirmation researchers so that their career advancement is separated from whether they obtain positive experimental results.


Export/Citation: EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
Social Networking:
Share |

Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Romero, Felipec.f.romero@rug.nl0000-0002-0858-7243
Additional Information: forthcoming in Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science
Keywords: replication, reproduction, incentives, scientific self-correction, social epistemology of science
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
General Issues > Experimentation
Specific Sciences > Psychology/Psychiatry
General Issues > Science Policy
Depositing User: Dr. Felipe Romero
Date Deposited: 16 Oct 2018 04:30
Last Modified: 16 Oct 2018 04:30
Item ID: 15159
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
General Issues > Experimentation
Specific Sciences > Psychology/Psychiatry
General Issues > Science Policy
Date: 2018
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/15159

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item