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Time-Entanglement Between Mind and Matter

Primas, Hans (2003) Time-Entanglement Between Mind and Matter. [Preprint]

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    Abstract

    This contribution explores Wolfgang Pauli's idea that mind and matter are complementary aspects of the same reality. We adopt the working hypothesis that there is an undivided timeless primordial reality (the primordial "one world''). Breaking its symmetry, we obtain a contextual description of the holistic reality in terms of two categorically different domains, one tensed and the other tenseless. The tensed domain includes, in addition to tensed time, nonmaterial processes and mental events. The tenseless domain refers to matter and physical energy. This concept implies that mind cannot be reduced to matter, and that matter cannot be reduced to mind. The non-Boolean logical framework of modern quantum theory is general enough to implement this idea. Time is not taken to be an a priori concept, but an archetypal acausal order is assumed which can be represented by a one-parameter group of automorphisms, generating a time operator which parametrizes all processes, whether material or nonmaterial. The time-reversal symmetry is broken in the nonmaterial domain, resulting in a universal direction of time for the material domain as well.


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    Item Type: Preprint
    Additional Information: Published in "Mind and Matter", vol, 1 (2003), pp.81-119
    Keywords: Mind-matter problem / Wolfgang Pauli / Entanglement / Tensed and tenseless time / Time operator / Time-reversal symmetry
    Subjects: General Issues > Laws of Nature
    General Issues > Reductionism/Holism
    Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics
    Depositing User: Hans Primas
    Date Deposited: 12 Jan 2004
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:12
    Item ID: 1565
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/1565

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