PhilSci Archive

On Forms of Justification in Set Theory

Barton, Neil and Ternullo, Claudio and Venturi, Giorgio (2019) On Forms of Justification in Set Theory. [Preprint]

WarningThere is a more recent version of this item available.

Download (353kB) | Preview


In the contemporary philosophy of set theory, discussion of new axioms that purport to resolve independence necessitates an explanation of how they come to be justified. Ordinarily, justification is divided into two broad kinds: intrinsic justification relates to how `intuitively plausible' an axiom is, whereas extrinsic justification supports an axiom by identifying certain `desirable' consequences. This paper puts pressure on how this distinction is formulated and construed. In particular, we argue that the distinction as often presented is neither well-demarcated nor sufficiently precise. Instead, we suggest that the process of justification in set theory should not be thought of as neatly divisible in this way, but should rather be understood as a conceptually indivisible notion linked to the goal of explanation.

Export/Citation: EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
Social Networking:
Share |

Item Type: Preprint
Barton, Neilbartonna@gmail.com0000-0002-3637-1730
Ternullo, Claudio
Venturi, Giorgio
Keywords: justification; set theory; continuum hypothesis
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Epistemology
Specific Sciences > Mathematics
Depositing User: Dr. Neil Barton
Date Deposited: 12 Mar 2019 17:17
Last Modified: 12 Mar 2019 17:17
Item ID: 15806
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Epistemology
Specific Sciences > Mathematics
Date: 2019

Available Versions of this Item

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item