Woodward, James (2019) Causal Judgment: What Can Philosophy Learn from Experiment? What Can It Contribute to Experiment. [Preprint]

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Abstract

This paper explores some issues having to do with the implications of empirical studies of causal cognition and how these relate to philosophical work on causation that is more normative in aspiration. Among the issues discussed are the role of appeals to “intuition”, similarities and differences between empirical investigations of causal cognition conducted by psychologists and investigations by experimental philosophers, the relationship between descriptive and normative accounts of causal reasoning and the role of invariance-based considerations in causal cognition. I explore how descriptive empirical work on causal cognition and philosophical accounts of causation can mutually inform each other.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Woodward, James jfw@pitt.edu
Additional Information:	This will be forthcoming in Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Science (ed Samuels and Wilkenfeld) . Bloomsbury. Published version may differ in minor ways from version posted here. Please quote from the latter.
Keywords:	causation, causal cognition, intuition, invariance, experimental philosophy
Subjects:	General Issues > Causation Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science Specific Sciences > Psychology
Depositing User:	Jim Woodward
Date Deposited:	21 May 2019 13:28
Last Modified:	21 May 2019 13:28
Item ID:	16036
Subjects:	General Issues > Causation Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science Specific Sciences > Psychology
Date:	May 2019
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/16036

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