PhilSci Archive

Choice-Based Cardinal Utility

Baccelli, Jean and Mongin, Philippe (2016) Choice-Based Cardinal Utility. [Preprint]

[img]
Preview
Text
BaccelliCBCU.pdf - Accepted Version

Download (769kB) | Preview

Abstract

We reexamine some of the classic problems connected with the use of cardinal utility functions in decision theory, and discuss Patrick Suppes’ contributions to this field in light of a reinterpretation we propose for these problems. We analytically decompose the doctrine of ordinalism, which only accepts ordinal utility functions, and distinguish between several doctrines of cardinalism, depending on what components of ordinalism they specifically reject. We identify Suppes’ doctrine with the major deviation from ordinalism that conceives of utility functions as representing preference differences, while being nonetheless empirically related to choices. We highlight the originality, promises and limits of this choice-based cardinalism.


Export/Citation: EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
Social Networking:
Share |

Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Baccelli, Jeanjean.baccelli@gmail.com0000-0003-0275-0377
Mongin, Philippemongin@greg-hec.com
Keywords: ordinal utility, cardinal utility, preference differences, preference intensity, representation theorems, Suppes, ordinalism, cardinalism, decision theory, philosophy of economics
Subjects: General Issues > Decision Theory
Specific Sciences > Economics
General Issues > Game Theory
Specific Sciences > Psychology > Judgment and Decision Making
General Issues > Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism
General Issues > Operationalism/Instrumentalism
General Issues > Philosophers of Science
Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Specific Sciences > Psychology
Depositing User: Jean Baccelli
Date Deposited: 17 Jul 2019 03:38
Last Modified: 17 Jul 2019 03:38
Item ID: 16224
Official URL: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/135017...
Subjects: General Issues > Decision Theory
Specific Sciences > Economics
General Issues > Game Theory
Specific Sciences > Psychology > Judgment and Decision Making
General Issues > Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism
General Issues > Operationalism/Instrumentalism
General Issues > Philosophers of Science
Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Specific Sciences > Psychology
Date: 2016
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/16224

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item