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The Representational Semantic Conception

Suárez, Mauricio and Pero, Francesca (2019) The Representational Semantic Conception. Philosophy of Science, 86 (2). pp. 344-365.

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Abstract

This paper argues for a representational semantic conception (RSC) of scientific theories, which respects the bare claim of any semantic view, namely that theories can be characterised as sets of models. RSC must be sharply distinguished from structural versions that assume a further identity of ‘models’ and ‘structures’, which we reject. The practice-turn in the recent philosophical literature suggests instead that modelling must be understood in a deflationary spirit, in terms of the diverse representational practices in the sciences. These insights are applied to some mathematical models, thus showing that the mathematical sciences are not in principle counterexamples to RSC.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Suárez, Mauriciomsuarez@filos.ucm.es
Pero, Francescafrancesca.pero@unifi.it
Additional Information: Appeared in Philosophy of Science 86 (2), pp. 344-365
Keywords: Semantic Conception; Structuralism; Modeling; Idealization; Practice
Subjects: General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
General Issues > Models and Idealization
General Issues > Structure of Theories
Depositing User: Prof Mauricio Suárez
Date Deposited: 06 Aug 2019 03:31
Last Modified: 06 Aug 2019 03:31
Item ID: 16299
Journal or Publication Title: Philosophy of Science
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Official URL: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/...
DOI or Unique Handle: 10.1086/702029
Subjects: General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
General Issues > Models and Idealization
General Issues > Structure of Theories
Date: April 2019
Page Range: pp. 344-365
Volume: 86
Number: 2
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/16299

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