Suárez, Mauricio and Pero, Francesca (2019) The Representational Semantic Conception. Philosophy of Science, 86 (2). pp. 344-365.
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Abstract
This paper argues for a representational semantic conception (RSC) of scientific theories, which respects the bare claim of any semantic view, namely that theories can be characterised as sets of models. RSC must be sharply distinguished from structural versions that assume a further identity of ‘models’ and ‘structures’, which we reject. The practice-turn in the recent philosophical literature suggests instead that modelling must be understood in a deflationary spirit, in terms of the diverse representational practices in the sciences. These insights are applied to some mathematical models, thus showing that the mathematical sciences are not in principle counterexamples to RSC.
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| Item Type: | Published Article or Volume | |||||||||
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| Additional Information: | Appeared in Philosophy of Science 86 (2), pp. 344-365 | |||||||||
| Keywords: | Semantic Conception; Structuralism; Modeling; Idealization; Practice | |||||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science General Issues > Models and Idealization General Issues > Structure of Theories |
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| Depositing User: | Prof Mauricio Suárez | |||||||||
| Date Deposited: | 06 Aug 2019 03:31 | |||||||||
| Last Modified: | 06 Aug 2019 03:31 | |||||||||
| Item ID: | 16299 | |||||||||
| Journal or Publication Title: | Philosophy of Science | |||||||||
| Publisher: | University of Chicago Press | |||||||||
| Official URL: | https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/... | |||||||||
| DOI or Unique Handle: | 10.1086/702029 | |||||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science General Issues > Models and Idealization General Issues > Structure of Theories |
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| Date: | April 2019 | |||||||||
| Page Range: | pp. 344-365 | |||||||||
| Volume: | 86 | |||||||||
| Number: | 2 | |||||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/16299 |
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The Representational Semantic Conception. (deposited 13 Aug 2018 04:33)
- The Representational Semantic Conception. (deposited 06 Aug 2019 03:31) [Currently Displayed]
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