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The Rationale of Rationalization

Veit, Walter and Dewhurst, Joe and Dolega, Krzysztof and Jones, Max and Stanley, Shaun and Frankish, Keith and Dennett, Daniel C. (2019) The Rationale of Rationalization. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Fiery Cushman argues that “[r]ationalization is designed not to accurately infer unconscious mental states, but to construct new ones; it is not a discovery, but a fiction”. While we agree in broad strokes with the characterization of rationalization as a ‘useful fiction’, we think that Cushman’s claim remains ambiguous in two crucial respects: (i) the reality of beliefs and desires, i.e. the fictional status of folk psychological entities, and (ii) the degree to which they should be understood as useful and representative. Our aim here is to clarify both points and illuminate how rationalization could be understood as a useful fiction. In doing so, we aim to explicate the Rationale of Rationalization.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Veit, Walterwrwveit@gmail.com0000-0001-7701-8995
Dewhurst, Joe
Dolega, Krzysztof
Jones, Max
Stanley, Shaun
Frankish, Keith
Dennett, Daniel C.
Keywords: rationalization, intentional stance, folk psychology, representation
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Psychology > Evolutionary Psychology
Specific Sciences > Biology > Evolutionary Theory
Specific Sciences > Biology > Function/Teleology
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Concepts and Representations
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Consciousness
Specific Sciences > Psychology > Judgment and Decision Making
Specific Sciences > Psychology
Depositing User: Mr. Walter Veit
Date Deposited: 15 Aug 2019 02:09
Last Modified: 15 Aug 2019 02:09
Item ID: 16328
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Psychology > Evolutionary Psychology
Specific Sciences > Biology > Evolutionary Theory
Specific Sciences > Biology > Function/Teleology
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Concepts and Representations
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Consciousness
Specific Sciences > Psychology > Judgment and Decision Making
Specific Sciences > Psychology
Date: 2019
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/16328

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