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The Compatibility of Downward Causation and Emergence

Gozzano, Simone (2017) The Compatibility of Downward Causation and Emergence. Philosophical and Scientific Perspectives on Downward Causation. pp. 296-312.

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Abstract

In this paper, I shall argue that both emergence and downward causation, which are strongly interconnected, presuppose the presence of levels of reality. However, emergence and downward causation pull in opposite directions with respect to my best reconstruction of what levels are. The upshot is that emergence stresses the autonomy among levels while downward causation puts the distinction between levels at risk of a reductio ad absurdum, with the further consequence of blurring the very notion of downward. Therefore, emergence and downward causation are not fit to each other vis-a-vis the concept of level.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Gozzano, Simonesimone.gozzano@cc.univaq.it0000-0002-2956-4120
Keywords: emergent properties; law; level; downward causation; causal powers.
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
General Issues > Causation
General Issues > Determinism/Indeterminism
General Issues > Laws of Nature
General Issues > Natural Kinds
Depositing User: Dr. Simone Gozzano
Date Deposited: 04 Jan 2020 02:12
Last Modified: 04 Jan 2020 02:12
Item ID: 16778
Journal or Publication Title: Philosophical and Scientific Perspectives on Downward Causation
Publisher: Routledge
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
General Issues > Causation
General Issues > Determinism/Indeterminism
General Issues > Laws of Nature
General Issues > Natural Kinds
Date: 2017
Page Range: pp. 296-312
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/16778

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