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Invention, Intension and the Limits of Computation

Greif, Hajo (2020) Invention, Intension and the Limits of Computation. [Preprint]

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Abstract

This is a critical exploration of the relation between two common assumptions in anti-computationalist critiques of Artificial Intelligence: The first assumption is that at least some cognitive abilities are specifically human and non-computational in nature, whereas the second assumption is that there are principled limitations to what machine-based computation can accomplish with respect to simulating or replicating these abilities. Against the view that these putative differences between computation in humans and machines are closely related, this essay argues that the boundaries of the domains of human cognition and machine computation might be independently defined, distinct in extension and variable in relation. The argument rests on the conceptual distinction between intensional and extensional equivalence in the philosophy of computing and on an inquiry into the scope and nature of human invention in mathematics, and their respective bearing on theories of computation.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Greif, Hajomail@hajo-greif.net0000-0002-1003-7494
Additional Information: This paper originated as a rather spontaneous and quickly drafted Computability in Europe conference submission. It grew into something more substantial with the help of the CiE reviewers and the author’s colleagues in the Philosophy of Computing Group at Warsaw University of Technology. Posted by permission of the journal editors.
Keywords: Artificial Intelligence; Intensionality; Extensionality; Invention in mathematics; Turing computability; Mechanistic theories of computation
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Ontology
Specific Sciences > Computer Science
Specific Sciences > Artificial Intelligence
Depositing User: Dr. Hajo Greif
Date Deposited: 10 Jul 2020 02:00
Last Modified: 10 Jul 2020 02:00
Item ID: 17449
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Ontology
Specific Sciences > Computer Science
Specific Sciences > Artificial Intelligence
Date: 30 June 2020
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/17449

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