Greif, Hajo (2020) Invention, Intension and the Limits of Computation. [Preprint]
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Abstract
This is a critical exploration of the relation between two common assumptions in anti-computationalist critiques of Artificial Intelligence: The first assumption is that at least some cognitive abilities are specifically human and non-computational in nature, whereas the second assumption is that there are principled limitations to what machine-based computation can accomplish with respect to simulating or replicating these abilities. Against the view that these putative differences between computation in humans and machines are closely related, this essay argues that the boundaries of the domains of human cognition and machine computation might be independently defined, distinct in extension and variable in relation. The argument rests on the conceptual distinction between intensional and extensional equivalence in the philosophy of computing and on an inquiry into the scope and nature of human invention in mathematics, and their respective bearing on theories of computation.
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| Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
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| Additional Information: | This paper originated as a rather spontaneous and quickly drafted Computability in Europe conference submission. It grew into something more substantial with the help of the CiE reviewers and the author’s colleagues in the Philosophy of Computing Group at Warsaw University of Technology. Posted by permission of the journal editors. | ||||||
| Keywords: | Artificial Intelligence; Intensionality; Extensionality; Invention in mathematics; Turing computability; Mechanistic theories of computation | ||||||
| Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Ontology Specific Sciences > Computer Science Specific Sciences > Artificial Intelligence |
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| Depositing User: | Dr. Hajo Greif | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 10 Jul 2020 02:00 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 10 Jul 2020 02:00 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 17449 | ||||||
| Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Ontology Specific Sciences > Computer Science Specific Sciences > Artificial Intelligence |
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| Date: | 30 June 2020 | ||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/17449 |
Available Versions of this Item
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Invention, Intension and the Extension of the Computational Analogy. (deposited 26 Feb 2020 00:38)
- Invention, Intension and the Limits of Computation. (deposited 10 Jul 2020 02:00) [Currently Displayed]
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