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Jury Theorems for Peer Review

Arvan, Marcus and Bright, Liam Kofi and Heesen, Remco (2020) Jury Theorems for Peer Review. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Peer review is often taken to be the main form of quality control on academic research. Usually journals carry this out. However, parts of math and physics appear to have a parallel, crowd-sourced model of peer review, where papers are posted on the arXiv to be publicly discussed. In this paper we argue that crowd-sourced peer review is likely to do better than journal-solicited peer review at sorting papers by quality. Our argument rests on two key claims. First, crowd-sourced peer review will lead on average to more reviewers per paper than journal-solicited peer review. Second, due to the wisdom of the crowds, more reviewers will tend to make better judgments than fewer. We make the second claim precise by looking at the Condorcet Jury Theorem as well as two related jury theorems developed specifically to apply to peer review.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Arvan, Marcusmarvan@ut.edu
Bright, Liam Kofiliamkbright@gmail.com0000-0001-5450-8748
Heesen, Remcoremco.heesen@uwa.edu.au0000-0003-3823-944X
Keywords: Philosophy of science Peer review Condorcet Jury Theorem Formal epistemology Social epistemology Bias
Subjects: General Issues > Decision Theory
Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
General Issues > Science and Policy
General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science
Depositing User: Remco Heesen
Date Deposited: 22 Aug 2020 03:18
Last Modified: 22 Aug 2020 03:18
Item ID: 18011
Subjects: General Issues > Decision Theory
Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
General Issues > Science and Policy
General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science
Date: 21 August 2020
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/18011

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