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Causation, Responsibility, and Typicality

Sytsma, Justin (2020) Causation, Responsibility, and Typicality. [Preprint]

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Abstract

There is ample evidence that violations of injunctive norms impact ordinary causal attributions. This has struck some as deeply surprising, taking the ordinary concept of causation to be purely descriptive. Our explanation of the findings—the responsibility view—rejects this: we contend that the concept is in fact partly normative, being akin to concepts like responsibility and accountability. Based on this account, we predicted a very different pattern of results for causal attributions when an agent violates a statistical norm. And this pattern has been borne out by the data (Sytsma et al. 2012, Livengood et al. 2017, Sytsma ms-a). These predictions were based on the responsibility attributions that we would make. In this paper, I extend these previous findings, testing responsibility attributions. The results confirm the basis of our predictions, showing the same pattern of effects previously found for causal attributions for both injunctive norms and statistical norms. In fact, the results for responsibility attributions are not statistically significantly different from those previously found for causal attributions. I argue that this close correspondence lends further credence to the responsibility view over competing explanations of the impact of norms on causal attributions.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Sytsma, Justin
Additional Information: Forthcoming in Review of Philosophy and Psychology.
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
Specific Sciences > Psychology
Depositing User: Justin Sytsma
Date Deposited: 18 Oct 2020 02:44
Last Modified: 18 Oct 2020 02:44
Item ID: 18255
DOI or Unique Handle: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-020-00498-2
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
Specific Sciences > Psychology
Date: 1 September 2020
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/18255

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