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Fictionalism and Meinongianism

Gan, Nathaniel (2021) Fictionalism and Meinongianism. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 36 (1). pp. 49-62. ISSN 2171-679X

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Abstract

Fictionalism about a kind of disputed object is often motivated by the fact that the view interprets discourse about those objects literally without an ontological commitment to them. This paper argues that this motivation is inadequate because some viable alternatives to fictionalism have similar attractions. Meinongianism—the view that there are true statements about non-existent objects—is one such view. Meinongianism bears significant similarity to fictionalism, so intuitive doubts about its viability are difficult to sustain for fictionalists. Moreover, Meinongianism avoids some of fictionalism’s weaknesses, thus it is even preferable to fictionalism in some respects.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Gan, Nathanielnat_gan@hotmail.com0000-0002-9463-7955
Additional Information: ISSN: 0495-4548 (print)
Keywords: Ontological debates; fictionalism; Meinongianism; mathematics.
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Ontology
General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
Specific Sciences > Mathematics
Depositing User: Unnamed user with email theoria@ehu.es
Date Deposited: 17 Feb 2021 15:30
Last Modified: 17 Feb 2021 15:30
Item ID: 18722
Journal or Publication Title: THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
Publisher: Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
Official URL: https://ojs.ehu.eus/index.php/THEORIA/article/view...
DOI or Unique Handle: 10.1387/theoria.21727
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Ontology
General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
Specific Sciences > Mathematics
Date: January 2021
Page Range: pp. 49-62
Volume: 36
Number: 1
ISSN: 2171-679X
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/18722

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