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Grounding, Conceivability, and the Mind-Body Problem

Khudairi, Hasen (2016) Grounding, Conceivability, and the Mind-Body Problem. Synthese. pp. 1-8. ISSN 0039-7857

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This paper challenges the soundness of the two-dimensional conceivability argument against the derivation of phenomenal truths from physical truths (cf. Chalmers in The conscious mind, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996; The character of consciousness, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) in light of a hyperintensional regimentation of the ontology of consciousness. The regimentation demonstrates how ontological dependencies between truths about consciousness and about physics cannot be witnessed by epistemic constraints, when the latter are recorded by the conceivability—i.e., the epistemic possibility—thereof. Generalizations and other aspects of the philosophical significance of the hyperintensional regimentation are further examined.

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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Keywords: Consciousness; Grounding; Conceivability; Two-dimensional Semantics
Depositing User: Hasen Khudairi
Date Deposited: 22 Feb 2021 22:41
Last Modified: 22 Feb 2021 22:41
Item ID: 18744
Journal or Publication Title: Synthese
Official URL:
DOI or Unique Handle: 10.1007/s11229-016-1254-2
Date: 2016
Page Range: pp. 1-8
ISSN: 0039-7857

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