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Epistemic feelings, metacognition, and the Lima problem

Greely, Nathaniel (2021) Epistemic feelings, metacognition, and the Lima problem. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Epistemic feelings like tip-of-the-tongue experiences, feelings of knowing, and feelings of confidence tell us when a memory can be recalled and when a judgment was correct. Thus, they appear to be a form of metacognition, but a curious one: they tell us about content we cannot access, and the information is supplied by a feeling. Evaluativism is the claim that epistemic feelings are components of a distinct, primitive metacognitive mechanism that operates on its own set of inputs. These inputs are heuristics that correlate with the presence of mental content that can’t be accessed directly. I will argue that evaluativism is unmotivated, unsupported, and ill-conceived. I will critique the philosophical and empirical arguments for evaluativism and conclude that there is no reason to posit a distinct mechanism to explain epistemic feelings. I will conclude, however, that epistemic feelings may constitute a nonconceptual form of metacognition, which if true is a significant claim.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Greely, Nathanielngreely@ucsd.edu
Keywords: epistemic feelings; evaluativism; feelings of knowing; feelings of confidence; metacognition; nonconceptual content; tip of the tongue experiences
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Concepts and Representations
Specific Sciences > Psychology > Judgment and Decision Making
Specific Sciences > Psychology
Depositing User: Mr. Nathaniel Greely
Date Deposited: 22 Feb 2021 22:32
Last Modified: 22 Feb 2021 22:32
Item ID: 18750
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Concepts and Representations
Specific Sciences > Psychology > Judgment and Decision Making
Specific Sciences > Psychology
Date: 2021
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/18750

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