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Phenomenal Roles: A Dispositional Account of Bodily Pain

Gozzano, Simone (2021) Phenomenal Roles: A Dispositional Account of Bodily Pain. [Preprint]

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Abstract

In this paper I argue that bodily pain, as a phenomenal property, is an essentially and substantial dispositional property. To this end, I maintain that this property is individuated by its phenomenal roles, which can be internal – individuating the property per se – and external – determining further phenomenal or physical properties or states. I then argue that this individuation allows phenomenal roles to be organized in a necessarily asymmetrical net, thereby overcoming the circularity objection to dispositionalism. Finally, I provide reasons to argue that these roles satisfy modal fixity, as posited by Bird, and are not fundamental properties, contra Chalmers’ panpsychism. Thus, bodily pain can be considered a substantial dispositional property entrenched in non-fundamental laws of nature.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Gozzano, Simonesimone.gozzano@cc.univaq.it0000-0002-2956-4120
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
Specific Sciences > Neuroscience > Cognitive Neuroscience
Depositing User: Dr. Simone Gozzano
Date Deposited: 04 Apr 2021 13:15
Last Modified: 04 Apr 2021 13:15
Item ID: 18887
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
Specific Sciences > Neuroscience > Cognitive Neuroscience
Date: 3 April 2021
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/18887

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