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A Psychological Theory of Reasoning as Logical Evidence—a Piagetian Perspective

Winstanley, M. A. (2021) A Psychological Theory of Reasoning as Logical Evidence—a Piagetian Perspective. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Many contemporary logicians acknowledge a plurality of logical theories and accept that theory choice is in part motivated by logical evidence. However, just as there is no agreement on logical theories, there is also no consensus on what constitutes logical evidence. In this paper, I outline Jean Piaget’s psychological theory of reasoning and show how he used it to diagnose and solve one of the paradoxes of material implication. I assess Piaget’s use of psychology as a source of evidence for logical theory in light of reservations raised by psychologism, and I highlight some ramifications for exceptionalism and anti-exceptionalism about logic by considering his use of psychology as logical evidence in the framework of genetic epistemology, Piaget’s research programme. I conclude that Piaget’s psychological theory of reasoning not only plausibly serves as a source of evidence for logical theory but also makes a strong case for anti-exceptionalism about logic.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Winstanley, M. A.218maw@gmail.com0000-0003-0036-1060
Keywords: Logic; logical evidence; exceptionalism, anti-exceptionalism; operations of thought; psychologism; constructivism; genetic epistemology
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Logic
Specific Sciences > Psychology > Developmental Psychology
General Issues > Evidence
Depositing User: Dr Mark Winstanley
Date Deposited: 30 May 2021 16:31
Last Modified: 30 May 2021 16:31
Item ID: 19121
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Logic
Specific Sciences > Psychology > Developmental Psychology
General Issues > Evidence
Date: 26 May 2021
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/19121

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